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I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
It is a safe assumption1 that every one of the twenty-eight EU Member States 
has some form of secondary liability principles within its general tort law.  
Traditionally, tort law principles require an element of deliberate contribution to, 
and therefore positive knowledge of, another person’s action.  They are therefore of 
limited value for situations like Internet infringement, because the contributor is 
typically unaware of persons committing concrete acts of infringement.  When the 
contributor merely provides the technical infrastructure that is used by an 
anonymous crowd for legitimate as well as illegitimate purposes, the “deliberate 
contribution” or “positive knowledge” element is difficult to prove. 
The general principles of tort law are not harmonized within Europe.2  However, 
regarding Internet services that may be misused for unlawful acts (including, but 
not limited to, intellectual property infringement), the E-Commerce Directive has 
created a legal framework for exemptions from liability (the safe harbor).3  In that 
regard, the E-Commerce Directive is the European equivalent of the U.S. Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), with the notable distinction that the E-
Commerce Directive applies horizontally, thus encompassing trademark 
infringement.  Articles 12 through 14 of the E-Commerce Directive stipulate that, 
regarding transmission, caching and hosting, no liability will ensue if the person 
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 1. It is not clear whether this particular aspect has ever been investigated in a comparative study 
covering all twenty-eight EU Member States. 
 2. Preparatory work on harmonization and unification of European Civil Law was commenced 
in the 1980s by a group of scholars formed around the Danish professor Ole Lando (the Lando 
Commission) and was later continued by several academic groups.  Two of them, the Study Group on a 
European Civil Code and the Research Group on EC Private Law (Acquis Group), prepared a Draft 
Common Frame of Reference (DCFR) in 2009.  See STUDY GRP. ON A EUROPEAN CIVIL CODE & 
RESEARCH GRP. ON EC PRIVATE LAW (ACQUIS GRP.), PRINCIPLES, DEFINITIONS AND MODEL RULES OF 
EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (2009), available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/civil/docs/dcfr_outline 
_edition_en.pdf .  The DCFR contains a chapter on non-contractual liability, but the emphasis is on 
issues of contract law.  See id.  The report led to a European Commission proposal for a Regulation on a 
Common European Sales Law (CESL).  Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on a Common European Sales Law, SEC (2011) 1165 final (Oct. 11, 
2011). 
 3. Directive 2000/31/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 2000 on 
Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic Commerce, in the 
Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1–16 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive]. 
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rendering such services:  (1) confines his or her role to enabling use by others; and 
(2) reacts expeditiously upon receiving information about illegitimate content.4  
Article 15 sets forth explicitly that Internet service providers (ISPs) acting within 
the limits prescribed in Articles 12 through 14 have no obligation to monitor 
content proactively.5  The directive does not spell out the consequences for ISPs 
that do not comply with those rules.  The legal grounds on which they are 
eventually held liable, and whether liability is for secondary or primary 
infringement, are to be determined by national law.6 
A second act of EU legislation relevant to secondary liability is the Enforcement 
Directive.7  Articles 11 and 8(1)(c) of the Enforcement Directive stipulate that 
Member States may issue permanent injunctions and grant requests for third-party 
information against those providing commercial services that are used for an 
infringement.8  Again, the Directive does not specify further the legal grounds on 
which liability shall rest. 
As the legal interest in pursuing infringers increasingly turns towards 
intermediaries, it is frequently necessary for courts to decide cases that address the 
principles set out in the E-Commerce and Enforcement Directives.  As yet, it is still 
difficult to obtain a complete picture of current legal practices in the Member 
States.9  Although the decisions rendered by the Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) have not substantially alleviated the law’s obscurity, some basic 
principles can be derived from the court’s case law.  Generally speaking, the CJEU 
is cautious when the interests of intellectual property owners are pitched against 
 
 4. Id. at 12–13. 
 5. Id. at 13. 
 6. For more details, see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Secondary Liability for Online Trademark 
Infringement:  The International Landscape, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 463 (2014). 
 7. Council Directive 2004/48/EC, on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. 
(L 157) 45–86 [hereinafter Enforcement Directive]. 
 8. Article 11 states, “Member States shall . . . ensure that rightholders are in a position to apply 
for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party to infringe an 
intellectual property right, without prejudice to Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC [the Copyright 
Directive].”  Id. at 76.  Under Article 8(1)(c), 
Member States shall ensure that, in the context of proceedings concerning an infringement of an 
intellectual property right and in response to a justified and proportionate request of the claimant, 
the competent judicial authorities may order that information on the origin and distribution 
networks of the goods or services which infringe an intellectual property right be provided by the 
infringer and/or any other person who . . . was found to be providing on a commercial scale 
services used in infringing activities. 
Id. at 67–68.  The wording of Article 8(3) of Directive 2001/29/EC is the same as the third sentence of 
Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive, but for the fact that it refers to copyright and related rights 
instead of IP in general.  See Directive 2001/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 
May 2001 on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the Information 
Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10. 
 9. For comparative accounts of legal practices in select EU countries, see Rita Matulionyte & 
Sylvie Nérisson, The French Route to an ISP Safe Harbour, Compared to German and US Ways, 42 
INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 55 (2011); Matthias Leistner, Common Principles of 
Secondary Liability?, in COMMON PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 117–46 
(Ansgar Ohly ed.).  See also Dinwoodie, supra note 6. 
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those of ISPs.10  The CJEU emphasizes the principle—enshrined in Article 15 of 
the E-Commerce Directive—that ISPs should not be subject to a general 
monitoring obligation,11 and several decisions have called for a fair balance 
between efficient enforcement of IP rights and countervailing values, such as the 
freedom to conduct a business,12 protection of private data13 and other fundamental 
rights.14  However, the CJEU took a stricter position regarding the conditions under 
which ISPs can avail themselves of the safe harbor clauses in the E-Commerce 
Directive, stating that liability might be triggered by any kind of active involvement 
in shaping content.15 
Due to the uncertainties prevailing in the patchwork structure of current EU law, 
this Article does not undertake to provide a comprehensive account of the pertinent 
problems and solutions throughout Europe.  Instead, the presentation focuses on 
German law, where the mechanism of Störerhaftung (the liability of a Störer, 
meaning “disquietor” or “interferer”) has attracted some attention in other Member 
States.16 
This Article will address cases in which ISPs face liability without directly 
committing an allegedly infringing act.  It will then discuss whether, and under 
what conditions, ISPs may be held liable (for primary infringement or otherwise) 
under the safe harbor rules in the E-Commerce Directive.  The following section 
expands on the notion of Störerhaftung in German law, explaining its origin, basic 
requirements and contentious features.  The operation of the Störer-mechanism will 
be illustrated by reference to case law, in particular a recent series of decisions 
regarding the services of RapidShare.  As those decisions concern copyright 
infringement, the conclusion addresses the extent to which they could have 
repercussions for issues of trademark infringement. 
II.  WHAT KIND OF INFRINGEMENTS ARE WE TALKING ABOUT? 
As pointed out above, one obvious distinction between the U.S. and the EU 
approaches towards secondary liability is that the pertinent EU provisions apply 
horizontally:  they do not distinguish between infringement of copyright, on the one 
hand, and other IP rights on the other.  This means that legal practices and case law 
 
 10. For trademark law, this cautious attitude is reflected in particular in Joined Cases C-
236/08−C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-02417. 
 11. Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs 
SCRL (SABAM), 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, ¶ 40. 
 12. Id. ¶ 48; Case C-360/10, Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers 
CVBA (SABAM) v. Netlog NV, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000, 2 C.M.L.R. 18 (2012), ¶ 46, available at 
http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=119512&doclang=EN. 
 13. Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de España 
SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271, ¶¶ 41, 68; Case C-461/10, Bonnier Audio AB v. Perfect Communication 
Sweden AB, 2012 E.C.R. I-00000, 2 C.M.L.R. 42 (2012), ¶ 59, available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/ 
document/document.jsf?docid=121743& doclang=EN. 
 14. Case C-360/10, Netlog, ¶¶ 41–43; Case C-70/10, Scarlet, ¶¶ 43–45. 
 15. Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶¶ 115−116. 
 16. See L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 1094, [455] (Arnold, J.) (Eng.). 
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developed with regard to copyright law are also basically applicable in the area of 
trademark law.  Upon closer inspection, however, it may be that even in the EU, 
applicable standards and concerns in copyright cannot simply be transposed to 
trademark.  Despite the common legal groundwork, the different considerations to 
be adjudicated might call for different reasoning in trademark cases.17 
For a rough sketch of claims that seek to establish liability of ISPs in connection 
with trademark infringement, it may be appropriate to distinguish between two 
major types of infringement.  The main characteristic of the first, “Google-type” 
cases, is that the direct infringers use third parties’ trademarks as a means to catch 
the attention of Internet users, and thereby increase traffic to their own Web sites.18  
This will sometimes, but not necessarily, cause confusion about the actual source of 
communication.  This type of infringement is rather novel and does not fit easily 
into the traditional structure of trademark law.  It began with domain name 
grabbing,19 generated new phenomena such as metatagging20 and is now most 
relevant in the context of keyword advertising.21  Keyword advertisements, where 
search engines offer to “optimize” the display of advertising by selecting 
trademarks as keywords, are frequently the bases of claims for secondary liability 
for this type of infringement.22  In domain name grabbing cases, secondary liability 
might be claimed against registrars or administrative contacts.23  These cases have 
hardly any parallel in the context of copyright infringement; they appear to be 
trademark-specific. 
The second type of case concerns sales of counterfeits (or goods otherwise 
 
 17. It may also be noted, in this context, that the German notion of Störerhaftung is regularly 
applied only in trademark and copyright law.  In patent law, a narrower notion of tortious contributory 
liability applies.  This schism in German jurisprudence may be due to the fact that indirect liability is 
explicitly regulated in Section 10 of the German Patent Act, but also reflects different attitudes 
prevailing in the German Federal Court of Justice chambers dealing with patents and with other IP 
rights, respectively.  See generally Leistner, supra note 9, at 123–30. 
 18. See, e.g., Joined Cases C-236/08−C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier 
SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-02417. 
 19. The issue was first raised in the 1990s and led, in the U.S., to specific legislation.  
Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d) (2012).  The Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) adopted the parallel Uniform Dispute 
Resolution Policy (UDRP).  Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy, INTERNET CORP. FOR 
ASSIGNED NAMES & NUMBERS, http://www.icann.org/en/help/dndr/udrp/policy. 
 20. See Brookfield Commc’ns v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999); 
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 55 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 1999).  In 
Germany, metatagging is considered to be infringing unless it can be justified by specific reasons.  See 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 18, 2006, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ 
UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 65, 2007 (Ger.) (Impuls); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of 
Justice] Feb. 8, 2007, 9 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 784, 2007 
(Ger.) (AIDOL).  The CJEU has never addressed the issue of metatags in the context of trademark law. 
 21. See, e.g., Google France, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417. 
 22. See id. 
 23. Indirect liability of the so-called admin-c (administrative contact) registered with the domain 
name registry (in Germany, DENIC administering the TLD.de) has become a topic frequently addressed 
by German courts.  For an overview of the resulting decisions, see Thomas Hoeren and Sonja 
Eustergerling, Die Haftung des Admin-C:  Ein kritischer Blick auf die Rechtsprechung, 9 MULTIMEDIA 
UND RECHT [MMR] 132, 132–38 (2006) (Ger.). 
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infringing trademark rights) that are offered through Internet platforms on 
particular auction sites.24  Unlike the previous category, there are no particular legal 
obstacles to classifying the direct acts committed by users of the ISP’s services as 
infringement.  Generally, the illicit character of knock-off goods can be taken for 
granted.  These cases arguably bear some resemblance to the notorious issue of 
file-sharing Web sites for illegally reproduced content.  However, unlike the issue 
presented by file-sharing and other cases of unauthorized Web sites that create 
access to copyrighted works, consumers cannot download counterfeits and other 
trademark-infringing goods directly from the Internet—the physical article needs to 
be shipped to the customer.  Also unlike copyright infringements via unauthorized 
file-sharing Web sites, counterfeits are neither offered for free nor mutually 
exchanged among users in a general scheme of “sharing”; some payment will 
always be made.25  Lastly and most importantly, while digital files of music, books 
or movies are reproduced at the click of a button, such that one illegal copy can 
become viral and engender millions of others, each individual counterfeit article 
must be produced by analog means in the analog world.  All of this makes it less 
likely that intermediaries will develop business models specifically aimed at 
offering counterfeit articles.26  Auction platforms or other virtual marketplaces 
usually flourish only if what is offered meets the demands of the customers, and 
while customers want to make a good bargain, they are not likely to be interested 
solely in fakes. 
III.  CONDITIONS FOR ESTABLISHING LIABILITY 
A.  PRIMARY VS. SECONDARY LIABILITY 
Proposed secondary liability regimes suffer from a lack of established taxonomy 
separating the different forms of liability, which are not labeled in a universally 
accepted manner.  There is no common understanding of what, exactly, is meant by 
“indirect,” “secondary,” “contributory” or “vicarious” infringement.27  The line 
 
 24. That is, goods bearing signs that are similar to protected marks, without a close enough 
resemblance to classify as “counterfeit” in the meaning of footnote 14 to TRIPS Article 51.  Agreement 
on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 51 n. 14, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh 
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, THE LEGAL TEXTS:  THE RESULTS 
OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 
322 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].  Furthermore, due to the principle of so-called regional exhaustion, 
even sales of original goods would be considered infringements in the EU if the rights holder has only 
consented to marketing outside the EU. 
 25. Such payments leave traces that may assist the rights holder in tracking down the source of 
the infringement.  In that context, it may be interesting to note that the German Federal Court of Justice 
has decided to refer to the CJEU the question of whether Article 8(3) of the Enforcement Directive 
requires a bank to disclose the name and address of a customer to whose account payments have been 
made for counterfeit articles, or whether the bank can invoke banking confidentiality as a defense under 
Article 8(3)(e).  Case C-580/13, Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bundesgerichtshof (Germany) 
lodged on 18 November 2013, Coty Germany GmbH v. Stadtsparkasse Magdeburg, 2014 O.J. (C 31) 4. 
 26. One possible exception is depersonalization services. 
 27. See Dinwoodie, supra note 6. 
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separating primary infringement from the diverse forms of secondary liability is 
also uncertain. 
In the EU, the differences between the two depend on the specifics of national 
law.  Nevertheless, EU law sets out some minimum requirements for finding 
primary trademark infringement by ISPs.  Most importantly, any finding of 
trademark infringement under harmonized trademark law,28 as well as under the 
Community Trademark Regulation (CTMR),29 depends on whether the ISP has 
used the mark in the course of trade in a manner that affects or is likely to affect the 
trademark functions.30  In part, this analysis assesses whether the alleged infringer 
has used the mark in its own commercial communication.31  That element was 
found not to have been met with regard to search engines (“referencing service 
providers”) operating a keyword advertising system; the CJEU found that: 
[T]he referencing service provider operates “in the course of trade” when it 
permits advertisers to select, as keywords, signs identical with trade marks, 
stores those signs and displays its clients’ ads on the basis thereof, [but] it 
does not follow . . . from those factors that that service provider itself “uses” 
those signs . . . .  [U]se, by a third party, of a sign identical with, or similar to, 
the proprietor’s trade mark implies, at the very least, that that third party uses 
the sign in its own commercial communication.  A referencing service 
provider allows its clients to use signs which are identical with, or similar to, 
trade marks, without itself using those signs.32 
Similarly, with regard to auction platforms and other Internet marketplaces, the 
court found that: 
In so far as [a] third party provides a service consisting in enabling its 
customers to display on its website, in the course of their commercial 
activities such as their offers for sale, signs corresponding to trade marks, it 
does not itself use those signs within the meaning of . . . EU legislation.33 
Consequently, national courts in the EU have no more room for examining whether 
ISPs such as Google or eBay are liable for direct trademark infringement:  it must 
 
 28. EU trademark laws have been harmonized on the basis of the Trade Mark Directive.  Council 
Directive 89/104, of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to 
Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40) 1–7 (EU) (original enactment); Directive 2008/95, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 22 October 2008 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States 
Relating to Trade Marks, 2008 O.J. (L 299) 25–33 (EU) (codified version). 
 29. Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, 1994 O.J. (L 
11) 1–36 (EC); Council Regulation 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community Trade Mark, 2009 
O.J. (L 78) 1–42 (EC) (codified version). 
 30. See, e.g., Case C-487/07, L’Oréal SA v. Bellure NV, 2009 E.C.R. I-5185, ¶¶ 58–65; Case C-
48/05, Adam Opel AG v Autec AG, 2007 E.C.R. I-1017, ¶¶ 16–37; Case C-206/01, Arsenal Football 
Club plc v. Reed, 2002 E.C.R. I-10273, ¶¶ 38–62. 
 31. See Case C-119/10, Frisdranken Industrie Winters BV v. Red Bull GmbH, 2011 E.C.R. I-
13179, ¶ 30; Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 102; Joined Cases C-
236/08−C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶ 56. 
 32. Google France, 2010 E.C.R. I-2417, ¶¶ 55−56. 
 33. L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 102. 
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be taken for granted that they are not.  However, both search engines and auction 
platforms may still be found liable as secondary (contributory) infringers.  
Furthermore, the court’s ruling leaves open the possibility of finding other direct 
violations.  For instance, if a search engine fails to clearly tag the sponsored links in 
a manner that enables users to recognize them as commercial advertisements, this 
failure would clash with the requirements set out in Article 6(a) of the E-Commerce 
Directive and thus result in primary liability.34  Direct liability may also result from 
negligence for failure to carry out specific legally required duties—such as storing 
and providing correct information on the identity of users—set out in national 
law.35 
B.  NEUTRALITY AS A CONDITION FOR INVOKING SAFE HARBOR 
Irrespective of the legal ground on which claims for primary or secondary 
infringement are raised, an ISP is safe if it has respected the limits set out in Article 
14 of the E-Commerce Directive, i.e., if the ISP has assumed a neutral and passive 
role, and if it has acted expeditiously upon being notified of the infringement.36  
The crucial question, therefore, is to what extent an ISP must refrain from activity 
of its own in order to be considered neutral.  In L’Oréal, the CJEU seemed to 
announce a rather strict standard.  It observed that 
the mere fact that the operator of an online marketplace stores offers for sale 
on its server, sets the terms of its service, is remunerated for that service and 
provides general information to its customers cannot have the effect of 
denying it the exemptions from liability provided for by [the E-Commerce 
Directive].  Where, by contrast, the operator has provided assistance which 
entails, in particular, optimising the presentation of the offers for sale in 
question or promoting those offers, it must be considered not to have taken a 
neutral position between the customer-seller concerned and potential buyers 
but to have played an active role of such a kind as to give it knowledge of, or 
control over, the data relating to those offers for sale.37 
The decision leaves many issues open-ended, and has been met with different 
reactions by Member States.  Courts in France seem prone to deny the shelter of 
Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive to sites providing any service beyond mere 
content storage (“hosting providers 1.0”).38  In Germany, however, the dominant 
view is that assistance, such as the presentation of offers on an auction site, is not 
 
 34. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 3, at 11.  (“In addition to other information requirements 
established by Community law, Member States shall ensure that commercial communications which are 
part of, or constitute, an information society service comply at least with the following conditions:  (a) 
the commercial communication shall be clearly identifiable as such . . . .”). 
 35. Such a duty exists, for example, in France; negligence of that duty formed one of the claims 
in the Tiscale case.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Jan. 14, 2010, 
Bull. Civ. I, No. 8 (Fr.).  See also Matulionyte & Nérisson, supra note 9. 
 36. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 3, art. 14. 
 37. L’Oréal, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶¶ 115−16 (emphasis added). 
 38. See Matulionyte & Nérisson, supra note 9, at 61. 
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detrimental to the ISP’s safe harbor if such assistance is rendered in an automated 
form; if the assistance merely consists of suggestions proffered by operation of 
algorithms, there is no basis for concluding that the ISP will obtain positive 
knowledge of, and acquire control over, data relating to the products on sale.39 
IV.  THE CONCEPT OF STÖRERHAFTUNG 
As noted above, notwithstanding differences of national law regarding details 
and terminology, many legal systems embrace the rule that a person assisting a 
tortfeasor, or inciting him to commit an unlawful act, will be held liable for 
contributing to the tort.  Such liability, however, traditionally requires that the 
contributor is positively aware of the act resulting in primary infringement, and of 
the person committing it.  In Germany, for example, when an ISP has no actual 
knowledge of individual persons using its services and is unaware of their conduct, 
then secondary infringement in the strict sense of aiding and abetting is usually out 
of question.40  Instead, liability is based on the concept of Störerhaftung.  This 
concept is derived by analogy from a provision in the civil code entitling 
proprietors to request that interferences resulting in detrimental effects on their 
property be removed and enjoined in the future.41  Objective liability standards 
apply, and guilt or negligence need not be established.42  Showing of detrimental 
effects is sufficient unless the interference must be tolerated by the proprietor for 
specific reasons.43 
Application of the Störer principles in the IP context was well established before 
the advent of the Internet.  Based on those rules, injunctions could be issued, for 
example, against persons unwittingly storing or transporting infringing goods.44  
Claims were granted under the following conditions:  (1) the defendant is not liable 
for primary or secondary infringement; (2) an adequate causal link exists between 
the acts or omissions of the defendant and an (ongoing) infringement of an IP right 
(resulting in the “interference”) and (3) the defendant is (factually and legally) able 
to remove the cause of the ongoing infringement.45 
In order to contain the obligations imposed on the defendant, German courts 
 
 39. See, e.g., Gerald Spindler, Europarechtliche Rahmenbedingungen der Störerhaftung im 
Internet:  Rechtsfortbildung durch den EuGH in Sachen L’Oréal/eBay, 14 MULTIMEDIA UND RECHT 
[MMR] 703, 705 (2011) (Ger.). 
 40. Whether the ISP can be held liable for aiding and abetting is a question that is regularly 
examined (and denied) in cases applying the concept of Störerhaftung.  See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof 
[BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 11, 2004, 36 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 
573, 578, 2005 (Ger.) (Internet Auction I). 
 41. BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Jan. 2, 2002, BUNDESGESETZBLATT 
[BGB] I page 42, as amended, § 1004 (Ger.). 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. 
 44. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 15, 1957, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 352, 1957 (Ger.). 
 45. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 12, 2012, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 370, ¶ 19, 2013 (Ger.) (Alone in the Dark). 
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have further held that no liability will attach unless the defendant has incurred and 
neglected certain monitoring duties.46  The existence, scope and content of such 
duties have therefore become the focal point of legal discussions and case law. 
Quite importantly, Störerhaftung does not provide a basis for damage claims or 
other sanctions beyond removal of the actual interference and further prevention of 
the same.47  This follows from the fact that the interferer is not liable for primary or 
secondary infringement according to general tort rules.48  Furthermore, the 
defendant’s business is basically innocuous, and the burden of removing 
infringements committed by others must be weighed against the disruption of the 
defendant’s business that such a duty would cause.  On the other hand, this means 
that the nature of the services rendered should be considered in determining the 
scope of duties incurred:  if the service tends to encourage illicit behavior, the 
balancing test weighing the interests of the rights holder against those of the ISP 
may be tipped in favor of the former.49 
Because Störerhaftung only allows rights holders to seek injunctions,50 German 
courts feel free to apply the rule whether or not the activities of the ISP are covered 
by the safe harbor provisions in the E-Commerce Directive (as implemented in the 
German Telemedia Act).51  As expressed by Joachim Bornkamm, the presiding 
judge of the First Civil Senate of the Federal Court of Justice, “The Court 
consider[s] [the safe harbor principle] to apply fully to criminal liability and 
liability for damages, but not injunctive relief.”52  The court considered that 
interpretation to be “acte clair” (beyond doubt) and therefore did not refer the issue 
to the CJEU.53 
 
 46. Whereas jurisprudence sticks to the term “monitoring duties” (German:  Prüfpflichten), the 
literature emphasizes that those duties are of a more comprehensive nature, amounting to a duty to 
prevent further infringements (not to be confused with negligence of duties of care that result in a stand-
alone tort and direct liability for ISPs).  See Matthias Leistner, Störerhaftung und mittelbare 
Schutzrechtsverletzung, Supplement to GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 
1, 2010 (Ger.); see also Leistner, supra note 9, at 126 (using the phrase “reasonable duty of care to 
prevent direct infringement”).  Although Leistner’s observation is certainly correct, this Article will 
follow the terminology of the jurisprudence by using the phrase “monitoring duties” or its synonyms. 
 47. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 15, 1957, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 352, 1957 (Ger.). 
 48. See id. 
 49. This is illustrated by the RapidShare cases discussed in Part V of this article.  See infra Part 
V. 
 50. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jan. 15, 1957, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 352, 1957 (Ger.). 
 51. Telemediengesetz [TMG] [Telemedia Act], Feb. 26, 2007, BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGB] at 
179, 2007 I (Ger.). 
 52. Joachim Bornkamm, E-Commerce Directive vs. IP Rights Enforcement:  Legal Balance 
Achieved?, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INT’L 642, 643 (2007).  The judge’s 
reasoning appears sound:  before the ISP is alerted to an infringement, the ISP is not subject to any 
obligation.  After the ISP is informed, however, Article 14 requires immediate action to remove 
infringing content.  It follows that Articles 12 through 14 do not pose an obstacle for injunctions 
imposed after notification. 
 53. Leistner, supra note 9, at 125.  As Leistner states, the argument appears reasonable in light of 
the preamble to the E-Commerce directive, in particular recital 45: 
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It remains unclear, however, whether this approach can be reconciled with 
Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, which proscribes any filtering or pre-
screening obligations.54  Under such circumstances, how can it be found that an ISP 
has incurred and neglected a duty to monitor?  The explanation lies in the 
distinction between a general duty to monitor, which cannot be imposed, and 
specific duties resulting from causes set in the ISP’s sphere.  This appears 
compatible with EU law, as expressed in recital 47 of the preamble to the E-
Commerce Directive:  “Member States are prevented from imposing a monitoring 
obligation on service providers only with respect to obligations of a general nature; 
this does not concern monitoring obligations in a specific case and, in particular, 
does not affect orders by national authorities in accordance with national 
legislation.”55 
This principle applies in a clear way when an ISP receives a court order, on the 
basis of Article 11 of the Enforcement Directive,56 to remove infringing content 
from its Web site.  One-time removal of actual content is not sufficient to comply, 
and recurrence of the same infringement must also be prevented, which necessarily 
compels some amount of monitoring.57  The same reasoning applies when the ISP 
has been duly notified of an ongoing infringement, without the issue being brought 
to court. 
While the general framework seems to be clear, its details are uncertain.  For 
instance, while the duty to monitor is firmly established once a court order has been 
received, things are less certain in the pre-trial stage, when rights holders’ claims 
may be exaggerated or even unfounded.  How can the ISP tell the difference?  
Unlike the DMCA,58 the E-Commerce Directive lacks specific provisions 
addressing this problem.  As a result, the German Federal Court of Justice has 
provided guidelines as to when a notification is to be considered serious and 
plausible enough to give rise to removal and prevention claims.59  However, those 
 
[T]he limitations of the liability of intermediary service providers established in this Directive do 
not affect the possibility of injunctions of different kinds.  Such injunctions can in particular 
consist of orders by courts or administrative authorities requiring the termination or prevention 
of any infringement, including the removal of illegal information or the disabling of access to it. 
E-Commerce Directive, supra note 3, art. 14, at 13. 
 54. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 3, art. 15, at 13. 
 55. Id. at 6, ¶ 48 (emphasis added).  Paragraph 48 continues: 
This Directive does not affect the possibility for Member States of requiring service providers, 
who host information provided by recipients of their service, to apply duties of care, which can 
reasonably be expected from them and which are specified by national law, in order to detect and 
prevent certain types of illegal activities. 
Id. 
 56. Council Directive 2004/48/EC, on the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 2004 O.J. 
(L 157) 76. 
 57. See Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 144. 
 58. See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3) (2012). 
 59. Notification must be concrete enough that its addressee can detect the infringement without 
an intensive legal and factual examination.  The extent of the examination the operator is expected to 
make depends on the circumstances of the individual case, especially on the gravity of the reported 
infringements and on the opportunities the operator has to detect them.  If the operator of an Internet 
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guidelines remain fairly vague and general.60 
V.  CASE LAW 
A.  GENERAL DEVELOPMENTS 
The bases for German jurisprudence on ISP liability were set out in the “Internet 
auction” cases.61  The Federal Court of Justice confirmed the rule that when 
infringing articles are sold on an Internet auction platform, the platform provider is 
not liable under general tort principles as a primary or secondary infringer as long 
as he does not have actual and concrete knowledge of the acts committed by 
others.62  Damage claims, therefore, cannot be established against the platform 
provider.  Nevertheless, after having been made aware of the infringement, he can 
be held liable as an interferer, at which point injunctive relief can be granted and 
preventive measures ordered.63 
The rule was subsequently modified with regard to situations in which the 
alleged primary tort concerns an act of unfair competition.  In such situations, the 
ISP is held liable for committing an independent tortious act under Section 3, the 
general clause of the German Unfair Competition Act.64  This change takes into 
account the fact that the ISP’s commercial activities create a relevant risk that 
others will engage in unfair competition.  This gives rise to an independent duty of 
reasonable care to control and limit such risks, the violation of which itself 
constitutes an act of unfair competition.65  In spite of the obvious parallels existing 
between that line of argument, on the one hand, and the principles of Störerhaftung 
on the other, the Federal Court of Justice has until now rejected suggestions that 
negligence could be an independent tortious act in trademark as well as in 
copyright infringement.66  Störerhaftung therefore remains an accessory to the 
 
marketplace has legitimate doubts concerning the infringement, he must notify the claimant thereof.  See 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 17, 2011, 44 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 123, 2013 (Ger.) (Perfume Stick). 
 60. See id. 
 61. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 30, 2008, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 702, 2008 (Ger.) (Internet Auction III); 
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Apr. 19, 2007, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ 
UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 708, 2007 (Ger.) (Internet Auction II); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] 
[Federal Court of Justice] Mar. 11, 2004, 36 INT’L REV. OF INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 573, 2005 
(Ger.) (Internet Auction I).  For an account of Internet Auction I in English, see Bornkamm, supra note 
52.  All three cases are extensively related in L’Oréal SA v. eBay International AG, [2009] EWHC (Ch) 
1094, [455] (Arnold, J.) (Eng.). 
 62. See Bornkamm, supra note 52. 
 63. See id. 
 64. “Unfair commercial practices shall be illegal if they are suited to tangible impairment of the 
interests of competitors, consumers or other market participants.”  BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] 
[CIVIL CODE], Mar. 3, 2010, DAS BUNDESGESETZBLATT [BGBl] 254, § 3, ¶ 2 (Ger.), translation 
available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_uwg/englisch_uwg.html#UWGengl_000P3. 
 65. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Jul. 12, 2007, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 890, 2007 (Ger.) (Jugendgefährdende Medien bei eBay). 
 66. See Leistner, supra note 9, at 127.  The distinction was somewhat blurred by a decision 
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main IP infringement, with the consequence, inter alia, that counterfeits offered for 
sale on auction Web sites do not have to be removed by the ISP if the seller was 
acting privately, and thus did not use the mark “in the course of trade.”67 
Of particular importance in all those cases are the scope and contents of the 
preventive duties imposed:  What content do they cover?  Which preventative 
measures are required of the ISP?  In that regard, it is clear and accepted that, 
irrespective of the proposition that the safe harbor provisions of the E-Commerce 
Directive do not apply to injunctive (and preventive) relief under the Störer 
concept, sanctions may not be imposed if they clash with the ban against general 
filtering obligations in Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive.68  The Federal 
Court of Justice has therefore emphasized the need to limit the preventive measures 
imposed to adequate and reasonable filtering that does not jeopardize the 
defendant’s business model.69  Nevertheless, the court has not confined such duties 
to future identical offers made by the same person, but rather has extended them to 
infringements that were essentially of the same character.70  Thus, in the first 
“Internet Auction” case, concerning offers of watches as “Rolex-replicas,” it was 
held that if the offers turned out to be infringing, the auction site needed to 
scrutinize more closely any future offers of Rolex watches on its Web site.71  
Likewise, in a case concerning offers of illicit material (computer games glorifying 
violence and Nazi-type propaganda), an auction site was ordered to prevent not 
only further offers of the same material by the same persons, but also offers of 
similar material by any others.72  In neither case did the court specify exactly what 
those measures should be; each defendant was left to identify the most appropriate 
 
finding the holder of an eBay account directly liable for sales of fake products his wife had offered 
through his account.  The court found liability via a false representative or impersonator, due to the fact 
that the defendant had not taken measures to conceal his password.  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal 
Court of Justice] Mar. 11, 2009, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 597, 
2009 (Ger.) (Halzband).  In a subsequent decision concerning similar facts (an unknown third party 
using unsecured WLAN access data to download protected content), the Federal Court of Justice 
returned to employing the Störer principles, refusing to analogize secure wireless account access data to 
a shared password for an eBay account.  Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 12, 
2010, GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 633 (634), 2010 (Ger.) (Sommer 
unseres Lebens). 
 67. The issue played a prominent role in the first and third of the Internet Auction cases, supra 
note 61, as well as in L’Oréal v. eBay: 
When an individual sells a product bearing a trade mark through an online marketplace and the 
transaction does not take place in the context of a commercial activity, the proprietor of the trade 
mark cannot rely on his exclusive right . . . .  If, however, owing to their volume, their frequency 
or other characteristics, the sales made on such a marketplace go beyond the realms of a private 
activity, the seller will be acting “in the course of trade” within the meaning of those provisions. 
Case C-324/09, L’Oréal SA v. eBay Int’l AG, 2011 E.C.R. I-6011, ¶ 55. 
 68. See Bornkamm, supra note 52. 
 69. See, e.g., Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 12, 2007, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 890, 2007 (Ger.) (Jugendgefährdende Medien bei eBay). 
 70. See Bornkamm, supra note 52. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 12, 2007, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 890, 2007 (Ger.) (Jugendgefährdende Medien bei eBay). 
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technical means for achieving the envisaged result. 
The potential range of obligations resulting from the concept of Störerhaftung 
was further illustrated by two recently decided copyright cases concerning the 
services of RapidShare—a Swiss-based firm that offers digital storage in the cloud 
that can be accessed world-wide for content of any kind.73  “Normal” users are not 
charged for storing services, but users opting for a “premium account”—which 
comes with more storage space and high-speed service—pay a monthly fee.74  
RapidShare used to offer “premium points” for uploading content that was 
attractive to others and thus received a high number of downloads; those points 
could be used for payment of premium account fees.  That model was abandoned in 
2010 after RapidShare was targeted for inciting copyright piracy.75 
It is undisputed that among the content stored on RapidShare are files that are 
illegally made available to the public; several lawsuits have therefore arisen in a 
number of countries.  One of the cases, brought in Germany, concerned links to a 
computer game (“Alone in the Dark”) that were available on RapidShare.  The 
links were removed after notification by the rights holder, but RapidShare refused 
to accept that it had a duty to prevent future access to the same game.76  The rights 
holder instigated proceedings, claiming that RapidShare was obligated to remove 
and prevent the game from becoming available on its Web site or other Web sites 
that were indicated in the claim.77  The appellate court, OLG Düsseldorf, denied the 
claim, finding that because RapidShare was not aware of individual infringements, 
it could not be held liable for aiding and abetting.78  Furthermore, the court found 
no reason to hold that RapidShare had neglected a monitoring duty and was 
therefore liable as an “interferer.”  The services offered by RapidShare were 
considered to be neutral und useful; therefore, the court reasoned, the business 
model should not be jeopardized by imposing overly strict duties to watch out for 
infringing content.79 
Upon further appeal on points of law, the Federal Court of Justice confirmed the 
Düsseldorf appellate court’s findings with regard to the neutrality and usefulness of 
the service, but nevertheless arrived at a different result.80  The court decided that 
preventative measures were required, in addition to the expeditious removal of 
files, from the time that notification of the infringing content was received:  
RapidShare could, and should, have installed a word filter to retrieve and delete 
access to all infringing files currently stored in its system, irrespective of the 
 
 73. Security | Our Offer, RAPIDSHARE, https://rapidshare.com/security/products (last visited Feb. 
23, 2014). 
 74. Id. 
 75. Janko Roettgers, RapidShare Ready to Launch Download Stores, GIGAOM (June 28, 2010 
8:57 AM), http://gigaom.com/2010/06/28/rapidshare-ready-to-launch-download-stores. 
 76. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 12, 2012, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 370, 2013 (Ger.) (Alone in the Dark). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 12, 2012, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 370, 2013 (Ger.) (Alone in the Dark). 
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persons uploading them.81  The court was apparently unconcerned that the method 
may not be completely efficient, as files are easily concealed if uploaded under a 
slightly different name.  The court also considered it appropriate and acceptable 
that, in order to distinguish files containing the illegally copied computer game 
from legal content (e.g., collections of photos) stored under the same name, the 
links retrieved by an automated search had to be re-examined manually.82  Finally, 
it found that imposing an obligation to search a handful of other Web sites for links 
to the computer game on RapidShare was not exceedingly onerous, and would not 
disrupt RapidShare’s business model.83 
About a year after that decision, the Federal Court of Justice decided 
RapidShare’s duty to monitor in a lawsuit filed by GEMA (the collecting society of 
composers and songwriters) concerning illegal uploads of 4815 music files.84  The 
appellate court below had acknowledged that RapidShare’s business model 
basically deserved protection against disruption, but nevertheless granted the claim 
on the grounds that RapidShare created a substantial risk of infringements, thus 
triggering enhanced duties of monitoring and preventive action.85  While 
recognizing that RapidShare had changed its business model so that uploading of 
commercially attractive (and therefore often illegal) content was not automatically 
rewarded by premium points, the court found that users were nevertheless likely to 
associate the Web site with its previous business practices.86  Based on such 
enhanced monitoring duties, RapidShare was ordered to take any possible measures 
to disable links, both on its own Web site and elsewhere, to any one of the 4815 
music titles specified in the claim, irrespective of who provided or linked the file.87 
The Federal Court of Justice agreed.88  The fact that the service had been 
explicitly recognized as neutral the prior year was explained by the different factual 
findings of the Düsseldorf court, on which the Federal Court of Justice had relied in 
its first RapidShare decision.89  The court gave little weight to the defendant’s 
argument that because uploading files does not necessarily mean that the copy is 
illegal or that the it will be used for illegal purposes, by deleting such files, legal 
copies stored for private use could also be destroyed.90  The Federal Court of 
Justice also approved the fact that the appellate court’s judgment amounted to a 
comprehensive market observation duty in regard to all 4815 music files, without 
limiting it to links which make available an identical copy of the file indicated by 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 15, 2013, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 1030, 2013 (Ger.) (File-Hosting-Dienst). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Aug. 15, 2013, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 1030, 2013  (Ger.) (File-Hosting-Dienst). 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. 
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the complaint.91  As the court stated, the defendant was “obliged to investigate, 
through search engines such as Google, Facebook or Twitter using appropriately 
formulated searches and possibly also with the assistance of so-called webcrawlers, 
whether indications can be found as to further illegal links to its service with regard 
to the relevant works.”92 
VI.  CONSEQUENCES FOR TRADEMARK LAW 
The German RapidShare cases are remarkable.  As noted above, the preventive 
measures imposed as a consequence of previous conduct were always meant to 
cover not only identical infringements committed by the same person, but also 
violations of the law that were essentially the same.93  Nevertheless, the second 
RapidShare decision in particular marks a conspicuous extension of an ISP’s 
monitoring duties.  The logical consequence of the August 2013 decision is that, 
any time rights holders notify an ISP of infringing content using storage space 
offered by a cloud operator, the ISP must act not only with regard to the actual 
copy, but also with regard to all other content possibly stored by the same or other 
persons; they must undertake a comprehensive and long-term monitoring of any 
copy reloaded or any link appearing to its service on other Web sites, with no clear 
guidance from the court as to how this shall be effected.  It is easily imagined how 
the “specific” duties thus incurred in individual cases will accumulate until the line 
between specific duties and a quasi-general duty to monitor becomes blurred. 
Here, we must keep in mind that national systems’ freedom to apply and 
develop their own doctrines is not limitless.  The consequences of German 
jurisprudence must be measured against mandatory principles of EU law, in the E-
Commerce Directive and other legal instruments, including the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights.  In a pending case concerning the unspecified duty of an ISP 
to block access to a Web site notorious for its infringing content (kino.to), 
Advocate General Cruz Villalón has declared that while rights holders may require, 
and courts may order, an ISP to block access to Web sites, it is incompatible with 
EU law to impose broad, unspecified blocking duties and leaving it to the 
defendant to figure out ways to cope with them.94  If that opinion is endorsed by the 
CJEU, it might cast a shadow over the recent RapidShare decisions. 
But what is the relevance for trademark law?  True, the legal provisions and 
principles apply uniformly to trademark and copyright infringements.  However, as 
mentioned earlier, certain factual divergences between typical copyright and 
trademark cases may mandate different treatment.  Auction platforms are usually 
less likely to be geared towards encouraging mass infringement, and the role of 
 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] July 12, 2007, GEWERBLICHER 
RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 890, 2007 (Ger.) (Jugendgefährdende Medien bei eBay). 
 94. Case C-314/12, UPC Telekabel Wien GmbH v. Constantin Film Verleih GmbH, 2013, ¶ 77, 
CURIA (Nov. 26, 2013), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/celex.jsf?celex=62012CC0314&lang1=en&type= 
NOT&ancre=. 
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ISPs is less “dangerous” in the trademark context because trademarked goods 
cannot be immediately downloaded.  Yet this distinction will not grant immunity 
against far-reaching duties to monitor:  RapidShare, for example, was not simply a 
rogue Web site, yet some of its features (e.g., acceptance of de-personalized use 
and payment schemes) were particularly risky and thus justified the imposition of 
enhanced market observation duties.  It is true that the problem of illegal files 
becoming viral and creating an infinite stream of unauthorized copies has no 
parallel in trademark law.  Still, once a source for counterfeit goods is displayed on 
the Internet, it may “live on” on other Web sites, even after the original link is 
removed.  While courts may be more cautious to impose extensive monitoring 
duties in trademark law, given that the technical difficulties of compliance would 
likely be thornier than in copyright, these duties are not beyond the logic of earlier 
German jurisprudence.95  From the perspective of ISPs, the only positive element 
of this scenario is that they will not be liable for payment of damages unless their 
duties are willfully neglected. 
How does the story end for RapidShare?  Reportedly, RapidShare’s efforts to 
remove features incentivizing illegal uploads resulted in a mass exodus of users, 
which could signal the end of its business activities.96  It is not clear whether that is 
good for rights holders; other sites offering similar services are still mushrooming.  
It is also unclear whether it is wise, as a policy matter, to subject providers of 
world-wide services to a medley of obligations and sanctions based on many 
different legal regimes, as happened in RapidShare’s case.  Would it be a better and 
safer solution to provide uniform law, so that the provider can predict legal 
requirements and adapt its business model accordingly?  This is an issue to be 
addressed in another Article.97 
 
 95. See discussion supra, Part V.A., regarding the Federal Court of Justice’s Internet Auction I 
decision and the accompanying order to monitor for future infringing offers of Rolex watches. 
 96. Enigmax, RapidShare:  Traffic and Piracy Dipped After New Business Model Kicked In, 
TORRENTFREAK (Jan. 9, 2013), http://torrentfreak.com/rapidshare-traffic-and-piracy-dipped-after-new-
business-model-kicked-in-130109. 
 97. Edouard Treppoz, International Choice of Law in Trademark Disputes:  From a Territorial 
Approach to a Global Approach, 37 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 557 (2014). 
